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In 2003 the federal-state Medicaid program provided prescription drug coverage to more than 50 
million people. To determine the price that it will pay for each drug, Medicaid uses the average 
private sector price. When Medicaid is a large part of the demand for a drug, this creates an 
incentive for its maker to increase prices for other health care consumers. Using drug utilization 
and expenditure data for the top 200 drugs in 1997 and in 2002, we investigate the relationship 
between the Medicaid market share (MMS) and the average price of a prescription. Our 
estimates imply that a 10 percentage-point increase in the MMS is associated with a 7 to 10 
percent increase in the average price of a prescription. In addition, the Medicaid rules increase a 
firm’s incentive to introduce new versions of a drug in order to raise price. We find empirical 
evidence that firms producing newer drugs with larger sales to Medicaid are more likely to 
introduce new versions. Taken together, our findings suggest that government procurement rules 
can alter equilibrium price and product proliferation in the private sector. 
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I. Introduction 
Does the Medicaid program distort the market price of pharmaceuticals and the number 
of versions of those drugs on the market? In 2003 the Medicaid program provided health 
insurance coverage for most health care services, including pharmaceuticals, to more than 50 
million low-income people in the United States (Kaiser, 2005). There is a large body of research 
examining the effects of this program on labor supply, savings, health care utilization, insurance 
coverage, and health outcomes.1 One issue that has received virtually no attention in previous 
work is the effect of Medicaid on the prices of health care treatments.2  
The contribution of this paper is to demonstrate that the effects of Medicaid procurement 
of prescription drugs are important. The basic intuition is straightforward and can be conveyed 
with three facts. First, Medicaid currently accounts for approximately 19 percent of 
pharmaceutical spending in the U.S., with this fraction varying substantially across drugs, and 
Medicaid covers essentially all drugs after their approval by the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA). Second, the price Medicaid pays a manufacturer for its drug is a set fraction of the 
average price paid by non-Medicaid consumers. And finally, a large fraction of pharmaceutical 
products enjoy some degree of market power due to patent protection. 
Thus, if a firm raises its price to non-Medicaid customers, it will receive a higher price 
for all Medicaid prescriptions filled. Because Medicaid recipients do not share in the cost of their 
medical care, they are likely to be unresponsive to changes in price. As government purchases 
become large, it is clear that linking prices in this way can create significant incentives to raise 
price in the private market.  
 To empirically test our hypothesis, we exploit variation in the importance of Medicaid 
purchasing across drugs. For example, in 2002 the program accounted for less than 6 percent of 
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revenues for Lipitor, the top-selling drug in the U.S. In that same year, nearly 75 percent of U.S. 
revenues for Zyprexa, the number eight seller overall, came from the Medicaid program. Our key 
explanatory variable is the Medicaid market share, which is defined as Medicaid revenues for a 
drug in year t divided by total revenues in that same year. We explore the relationship of this 
variable with pharmaceutical prices while controlling for other observable factors that should 
influence this outcome variable of interest. 
 Focusing first on the top 200 drugs in 1997, our findings demonstrate that pharmaceutical 
prices are significantly positively related with the Medicaid market share. The point estimates in 
our baseline specifications imply that a 10-percentage point increase in the Medicaid market 
share is associated with a 7 percent increase in pharmaceutical prices for the 1997 sample and a 
10 percent increase for the 2002 sample. 
One concern with this first set of estimates is that they may partially reflect an effect of 
prices on Medicaid market share rather than the reverse. Physicians may encourage Medicaid 
recipients to purchase expensive drugs while steering other patients with private insurance or no 
insurance to cheaper alternatives. To address this possible source of bias, we instrument for the 
Medicaid market share using variation across illnesses in the fraction of people enrolled in 
Medicaid, which we obtain from the National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey (NAMCS). Our 
results using this instrumental variables strategy are quite similar to those described above. We 
also estimate an analogous set of specifications for generic drugs, whose manufacturers should 
have much less power to set prices, and find no evidence of a positive relationship between 
Medicaid market share and price. These results strongly suggest that our estimates are capturing 
a causal effect of the Medicaid program on pharmaceutical prices. 
 In the second main part of our paper, we explore the effect of another potentially 
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important feature of the Medicaid procurement rules: price increases for any particular treatment 
may be no greater than inflation as measured by the Consumer Price Index (CPI). If the optimal 
price for a drug increases more rapidly than this index, there is an incentive over time to 
introduce new versions of a drug with different dosage amounts or route types (e.g. capsule, 
liquid, tablet) that would have unrestricted base prices. Firms must weigh the resulting increase 
in revenue against the cost of filing a new drug application with the FDA. Theoretically, one 
would expect firms with relatively large current and expected future sales to Medicaid to be most 
affected by this regulation. Consistent with this, our results demonstrate that new drugs with high 
Medicaid revenues introduce more new versions than do otherwise similar drugs. 
 Taken together, our results strongly suggest that Medicaid coverage of prescription drugs 
has increased the price paid by other health care consumers for these same treatments. Using our 
point estimates along with Medicaid shares for each of the top 200 treatments, the average price 
of a non-Medicaid prescription would have been 13.3 percent lower in 2002 in the absence of 
Medicaid’s pricing rule.  
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section II provides background on the Medicaid 
rules for determining pharmaceutical prices, formally lays out a pharmaceutical firm’s financial 
incentives, and describes the data used in our empirical analyses. Section III presents results for 
the effect of the Medicaid market share on average pharmaceutical prices while section IV 
describes our results for the effect on the rate at which new versions of a drug are introduced. 
The final section concludes and discusses important directions for future work. 
 
II. Institutions, Incentives, and Data 
A. Medicaid’s Rules for Setting Pharmaceutical Prices 
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Medicaid provides insurance for all major categories of medical care including 
prescription drugs. In 2003, this means-tested program provided coverage to more than 50 
million people and accounted for $280 billion in federal and state government spending. In 
contrast to Medicare, the program has almost no co-pays3 or deductibles and thus beneficiaries 
have little incentive to consider cost when choosing between treatments (Duggan, 2005). 
Each state administers its own Medicaid program but uses essentially the same formula 
for setting prices for each one of the thousands of covered drug treatments. The price for a brand 
name (as opposed to a generic) prescription drug is determined as follows. First, the state 
government reimburses the pharmacy that dispensed the drug according to a formula determined 
at the state level. The usual approach to reimbursement is some fraction of the drug’s AWP, 
which is a standard industry list price. This scaling factor varies from a low of 86.5 percent in 
Michigan to a high of 95 percent in Alaska (Kaiser, 2001). The pharmacy also receives a small 
dispensing fee that is approximately $5.00 in the typical state. Next, the federal Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) calculates a rebate that is equal either to 15.1 percent of 
the average manufacturer price (AMP) or to the difference between the AMP and the lowest 
price given to any buyer in the U.S., whichever is greater.4 AMP is the average price at which the 
manufacturer sold the drug and this is reported to CMS.5 This rebate amount is multiplied by the 
quantity purchased by each state and paid by the manufacturer to each state program so that the 
effective cost of drugs to the state is reduced.  
Additionally, the program specifies that after a new drug treatment has entered the market 
its Medicaid price cannot increase more rapidly than the rate of inflation as measured by the 
Consumer Price Index (CPI). If a firm’s optimal price for a drug is increasing more rapidly than 
the CPI, it can raise its price, but Medicaid will not pay the portion of the price increase that is 
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greater than the CPI. 6 However, the CPI cap applies to changes in price of the same product over 
time. The level at which a product is defined for purposes of Medicaid rebates is the first nine 
digits of the national drug code (NDC). An NDC is an eleven-digit code that defines a product 
perfectly: drug, form, route, strength, and package. The last two digits determine package size 
and are not used by the Medicaid rules (so a new package does not count as a new product). If a 
manufacturer alters strength, form, or route, it will be assigned a new NDC for the product, 
which may be priced in any way the firm desires. The rate of increase from that base is what is 
compared to CPI growth going forward. 
Thus a firm that wants to increase its Medicaid prices faster than the CPI can avoid the 
constraint by introducing new versions of its drug. This kind of behavior was first documented in 
the regulation literature by Averch and Johnson (1962) and later by many others (e.g. Parker, 
1999; Borrell, 1999; Olson, 1996; and Laffont and Tirole, 1993). The distortion of activity by the 
regulated entity is akin to the theoretical effects found in the principal-agent literature on 
multitasking (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991), in which the agent’s (firm’s) measured action 
responds to incentives but this is counteracted by an unmeasured action. In these papers, the firm 
responds to the constraints or payoffs for a specific task, which in our case is keeping price 
increases on existing medicines below a threshold. It uses another activity (introducing new 
versions of drugs) that is not specified in the regulation to mitigate the cost of the first constraint. 
This literature demonstrates the difficulty in achieving the regulator’s goals when those goals are 
in conflict with firm profitability and the manager has a choice of activities. For example, 
research on the Japanese market for prescription drugs documents frequent product introductions 
at high prices, and ascribes this behavior to regulation that allows considerable freedom to the 
manufacturer in setting the initial price but then imposes steep discounts after launch (Ikegami et 
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al, 1998). 
B. Procurement Incentives 
Consider two drugs that face identical demand curves except that part of the consumer 
base of one drug is eligible for the Medicaid program. Also assume that once enrolled in the 
program, Medicaid recipients have perfectly inelastic demand for the drug.7 Finally, the firm is 
not permitted to sell only to the Medicaid segment, but must sell into the private market and set a 
uniform price across segments. In this situation, the firm with Medicaid consumers will charge a 
higher price than the other, due to its more inelastic demand curve. Thus by tying the Medicaid 
price to the average price in the private sector, this procurement rule adversely affects other 
health care consumers through its effect on price. This result is not specific to Medicaid but 
holds in the more general case of a monopolist that is constrained to choose the same price in 
market segments with different elasticities (Tirole, 1991, pp137-138). 
As mentioned above, the Medicaid program constrains the rate at which the price of a 
particular treatment can increase over time to be no greater than inflation as measured by the 
CPI. If the profit-maximizing price for a drug is increasing more rapidly than this index, then a 
firm could respond by introducing new versions of the same drug and price the new versions 
higher than the old versions. Of course, in order to place these new products on the market, the 
firm must receive approval from the FDA. Approval for a new version of an already approved 
drug either requires a supplemental new drug application (NDA) or a completely new NDA, 
depending on the significance of the change.8 The costs of getting approval for a new version of 
an existing drug are the fee paid to the FDA, the cost of the clinical trials, and the delay.9 The 
firm would then weigh these costs against the benefits of unconstrained pricing. 
The benefit of unconstrained pricing relative to constrained pricing is that the firm can 
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increase its price to Medicaid when it introduces a new version. This is particularly important if 
the firm’s initial price becomes suboptimal (too low) due to unexpected demand growth from 
either the private or public sectors. If, on the other hand, the firm can perfectly forecast demand 
growth in excess of the CPI, it still has an alternative margin on which to respond. The firm can 
price high initially in order to relax the Medicaid constraint in the future. This strategy is also 
clearly costly, as it involves sub-optimal prices being charged for an extended period of time, 
and the risk that the environment changes and the chosen fixed price is not even the constrained 
optimum.  
In an environment of rising prices, the procurement rules create an incentive such that 
when sales to Medicaid are greater, the firm will find it more attractive to introduce a new 
version of its drug. Thus one would expect drugs with high sales to Medicaid – all else equal – to 
introduce more new versions in response to the program’s CPI constraint.  
C. Medicaid and IMS Utilization Data 
We merge together data from two main sources. The first source was provided by IMS 
(for Intercontinental Marketing Services) Health and contains total sales of all prescription drugs 
nationally from 1997-2002 for each combination of manufacturer and product. The data divide 
drug treatments into 14 therapeutic classes such as mental disorders, cardiovascular illnesses, and 
the alimentary tract. Within each of these therapeutic classes, drugs are further divided into 249 
subclasses, such as cholesterol reducers, antiulcerants, and antidepressants. 
There are 2391 different ingredient names in the data with strictly positive sales in one or 
more years between 1997 and 2002. An ingredient defines just one drug, though for many drugs 
there are multiple products in the IMS data. For example, a generic introduced after the patent 
for a brand name drug expires would be a different product. After the patent on Prozac expired in 
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2001, nearly 20 firms began to produce its generic equivalent fluoxetine, each of which is a 
separate product in our data. Additionally a firm may release a different product with patent 
protection, such as an extended release version, for its own branded drug.10 In the same year that 
Prozac’s patent expired it released a new version called Prozac Weekly that patients took just 
once per week. This appears as a separate product in our IMS data, but both the extended release 
version of Prozac and its generic versions all have the same ingredient name in our data. 
An observation is a drug and not a product because a product is the outcome of 
proliferation. Our measure of drug revenue therefore adds together the revenue of different 
products within a drug, all made by the innovator. This revenue measure does not include sales 
of generic competitors produced by different firms. Thus, in the example above, sales for both 
Prozac and Prozac Weekly would be included in U.S. revenues for Prozac, but those for the 
generic versions of fluoxetine would not.  
Our second main source of data are the CMS Drug Utilization files which track Medicaid 
spending by product code (NDC) in all 50 states and the District of Columbia in each year. In 
1997 there were 26,130 nine-digit NDCs that had non-zero Medicaid utilization with total 
spending equal to $13.5 billion.11 Thus Medicaid accounted for 16.9 percent of the $79.9 billion 
in prescription drug spending in the U.S. during that year. In 2002 the number of NDCs was 
22,111 and total Medicaid prescription drug spending was $29.6 billion, or 18.5 percent of the 
$160.6 in drug spending in the U.S.12 The Medicaid data also includes variables that allow us to 
determine whether a particular version of a drug is available over-the-counter or if it is generic, 
along with the FDA approval date and the date that each version entered the market. We define 
the number of NDCs for each drug in year t as equaling the number with more than 0.1 percent 
of each drug’s total prescriptions in that year. We define a version as entering between 1997 and 
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2002 if it had zero spending in 1997 and had more than 0.1 percent of the drug’s sales in 2002. 
Appendix Table 1 provides an example of a drug (Zyprexa) and the ten different versions of this 
drug that were sold in 2002. 
We then match the Medicaid and IMS data using drug names.13 Having done this, we can 
calculate a Medicaid market share by dividing Medicaid expenditure in all states by total US 
sales. In our empirical analyses we focus on the top 200 drugs in 1997 and in 2002 in terms of 
total U.S. revenues in each year. Our primary reason for limiting our focus is that we also use 
data from a publication called Med Ad News. This magazine publishes an annual list of the 
revenues of the top 200 global drugs and lists which conditions each drug is used for. These 
conditions form part of the input into our empirical analyses below. Additionally, the drugs in 
the top 200 include most of the spending on pharmaceuticals in the US: our 1997 sample of 200 
drugs accounts for 64.1 percent of total U.S. sales in the IMS data while those in our 2002 
sample are responsible for 72.6 percent of the total 2002 spending. Because the IMS data also 
includes sales of generic and over-the-counter drugs, the share of spending on brand-name drugs 
accounted for by the 200 drugs in our 1997 and 2002 samples are closer to 75 and 80 percent, 
respectively. So we are capturing the majority of the market with these 200 top-selling drugs. 
In our examination of prices and proliferation, we are interested in the incentives the 
regulation creates for brand name prescription drugs. We therefore exclude over-the-counter 
drugs because these are paid for out of pocket and thus not typically covered by Medicaid. We 
also exclude generic drugs because they face different Medicaid regulations and because the 
producers of these drugs will have less pricing power (because of free entry and homogeneity). 
We do not ignore generic drugs, however, as we include measures of whether our brand name 
drugs face generic competition in our empirical analyses of pricing and proliferation below. To 
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account for the amount of competition that each drug faces, we also consider the number of 
therapeutic substitutes for each drug. To estimate this, we calculate the number of other 
molecules within each drug’s subclass with nonzero sales in the relevant year. More details on 
the construction of these and other variables are included in the appendix.14  
 Table 1 provides summary statistics for our top 200 drugs in 1997 and 2002. The average 
drug in our 1997 sample has U.S. revenues of $256 million and a Medicaid market share of 16.5 
percent. The corresponding figures for the 2002 sample are $583 million and 17.7 percent.15 The 
variable Price per Prescription is equal to total Medicaid revenues divided by Medicaid 
prescriptions in each year. We use the Medicaid data to calculate price because it is not available 
in the IMS data (though a comparison of this with data from another source suggests that it is an 
accurate measure of average private prices in the US.).16 To reduce undesirable skewness in this 
measure we take the log of the average price and report this with the other summary statistics. 
 Table 1 also summarizes measures of competition for each of the top 200 drugs. The 
variable # of Substitutes is equal to the number of ingredients (excluding the drug itself) within 
the drug’s IMS subclass in the relevant year. These competitors are therapeutic substitutes for the 
focal drug. For both samples the average of this variable is approximately 14. There is a 
substantial difference between the two samples in the fraction of drugs facing generic 
competition, which declines from 28 percent in the 1997 sample to 16.5 percent in the 2002 
sample. This is perhaps partly because the average number of years that each drug is on the 
market falls from 9.1 to 8.2 and thus a smaller fraction of patents would have expired in the more 
recent sample. 
 
III. The Effect of Medicaid Market Share on Pharmaceutical Prices 
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In this section, we investigate the effect of a drug’s Medicaid market share on its average 
price. To estimate the importance of this effect, one would ideally use sharp and unanticipated 
changes in the Medicaid market share for one or more prescription drugs. This would allow one 
to control for time-invariant factors that are specific to each drug, including its effectiveness, 
ease of use, and production costs. Unfortunately, no such changes exist because Medicaid 
eligibility does not change rapidly from one period to the next, and because Medicaid covers a 
drug once it receives FDA approval.17 Later in this section, we utilize an instrumental variables 
strategy to account for the endogeneity of the Medicaid market share. 
We begin by exploiting the considerable variation across drugs in the Medicaid market 
share (MMS) to estimate the effect of the program on pharmaceutical prices. As our measure of 
MMS we take the ratio of Medicaid revenues to total U.S. revenues for that same drug. We 
control for other factors that are likely to influence the profit-maximizing price for a drug. The 
existence of generics introduces substantially more, and different, competition into the market, 
so we include an indicator of whether or not there is generic competition (GenComp) in the 
specification.18 As more therapeutic substitutes (Subst) become available, the drug will face 
additional competition and its optimal price should decline. Additionally, newer drugs tend to be 
more expensive than earlier ones, because they embody more new technology, and thus it is 
important to control for the time (Years) that a drug has been on the market. And finally, we 
include indicator variables for each of the fourteen major therapeutic categories when estimating 
specifications of the following type:19 
)1()kClass(I*YearsSubstGenCompMMS)ice(PrLog
14
1k
jtkjt4jt3jt2jt1jt ∑= =θ+β+β+β+β+α=  
In this equation, the dependent variable is equal to the log of the average price for a prescription 
for drug j in year t. Because even a log transformation of the average price is skewed (Duggan 
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and Scott Morton, 2004), we use rank order as an alternative dependent variable. 
The coefficient of particular interest in equation (1) is β1, which captures the conditional 
relationship between the Medicaid market share and price. In Table 2 we summarize the results 
of specifications of equation (1) for data from 1997 and 2002. Our results for the top 200 drugs 
in 1997 and 2002 are in the odd-numbered columns of the table. The point estimates of 0.674 
and 0.943 in columns (1) and (3) are significant at the five percent level and imply that a 10-
percentage point increase in the Medicaid share is associated with approximately a 7.0 percent 
increase in the average price in 1997 and a 10.0 percent increase in 2002. Drugs purchased 
disproportionately by Medicaid are significantly more expensive than otherwise similar drugs. 
The estimated coefficient of Years is negative and significant as expected. The estimate for the 
presence of generic competition is negative in both years but significant only in 1997. This 
negative relationship may actually be capturing an effect of the age of the drug, as the number of 
years on the market does not measure age exactly. The number of therapeutic substitutes has a 
significantly negative estimate in the specifications for both 1997 and 2002. 
Because of skewness in the distribution of the log of pharmaceutical prices, we next 
estimate specifications in which we use each drug’s rank in the price distribution as the 
dependent variable. This variable is uniformly distributed from 1 to 200 with the most expensive 
drug having a value of 200. The results using this alternative measure are summarized in 
columns (5) and (7) of Table 2 and are qualitatively similar to the originals. In both cases the 
estimates are statistically significant, at the 5 percent level in 1997 and at the 1 percent level in 
2002. Notice that in both specifications the implied effect of the Medicaid market share is 
substantially larger in 2002, suggesting that the effect of Medicaid may be increasing over time.  
We now turn to robustness checks. One concern with this first set of estimates is that it 
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may be capturing an effect of price on Medicaid rather than the reverse. For example, a physician 
may steer Medicaid recipients to an expensive drug while encouraging those with private 
insurance or no insurance to purchase a cheaper alternative within the same therapeutic class. If 
this reverse causation were important, it would bias up our estimates for the effect of MMS. To 
address this possibility, we estimated a companion set of specifications that considered only one 
branded drug from each of the 242 subcategories with nonzero sales in each year. The resulting 
variation in Medicaid market share across these drugs should largely be driven by differences in 
the fraction of individuals with particular illnesses on Medicaid. In some categories the top 
selling drug is either generic or available over-the-counter, so our sample has approximately 125 
drugs in each year. The results for this second set of specifications are summarized in the even-
numbered columns of Table 2 and present a quite similar picture. In all four specifications, the 
Medicaid market share is significantly positively related with average pharmaceutical prices.20  
Another possible source of bias is the presence of an omitted variable that is correlated 
with the Medicaid market share and also influences firms’ profit-maximizing prices. For 
example, drugs consumed differentially by Medicaid recipients may have higher production 
costs than otherwise similar drugs. To examine this possibility, we estimated an analogous set of 
specifications on a sample of the 200 top-selling generic drugs in 1997 and 2002. Because 
producers of generic drugs would have much less ability to set prices, this set of specifications 
serves as a falsification test for the ones presented above. The results of these analyses are 
summarized in Appendix Table 2. In no case is there a significant relationship between Medicaid 
market share and pharmaceutical prices. In fact, the estimates are negative in all four 
specifications, suggesting that if anything omitted factors would bias against finding a positive 
relationship between Medicaid market share and average prices for brand name drugs. 
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One potentially important issue is the sensitivity of our results to the exclusion of drugs 
with particularly high Medicaid market shares. As recent research has shown (Duggan, 2005), 
drugs used to treat antipsychotic illness have the highest Medicaid market shares, with this 
program accounting for almost 75 percent of revenues for Zyprexa, Risperdal, Seroquel, 
Clozaril, and Geodon. Given that these few drugs have both a large MMS and are substantially 
more expensive than the average treatment, it is possible that the inclusion in our sample is to 
some extent driving our results. We investigate the sensitivity of our estimates to excluding all 
antipsychotic drugs in each year (3 in 1997, 4 in 2002) and find that our estimate for the effect of 
the Medicaid market share is essentially unchanged.  
Another category of drugs with very high Medicaid market shares is HIV antiretroviral 
treatments. Almost half of U.S. residents with HIV are enrolled in the Medicaid program 
(Duggan and Evans, 2005). Our 1997 sample includes 5 drugs used to treat HIV while our 2002 
sample includes 9. Excluding any one of these drugs from our specifications has virtually no 
impact on our estimates but excluding all of them does have an effect. For example, in 2002 our 
baseline estimates of .943 and 65.4 for the log price and price rank specifications decline to .637 
and 50.1, respectively, when all 9 of the HIV/AIDS drugs are excluded. 
Our results continue to hold if we exclude the HIV and antipsychotic drugs from our 
smaller sample of one drug per subcategory. For example, the baseline estimate of 39.5 in 
column (8) of Table 2 declines to 38.6 when we exclude Combivir and Zyprexa, the top-selling 
HIV and antipsychotic treatments, respectively, in 2002. A similarly small change occurs for our 
1997 estimates when we exclude Epivir and Risperdal (the top HIV and antipsychotic drugs in 
that year). Taken together, these robustness checks therefore suggest that our results are not 
solely attributable to the categories of drugs with the very highest Medicaid market shares.  
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As a final check on our estimates, we employ an instrumental variables strategy. We 
create a predicted MMS for each drug by estimating the fraction of potential customers of a drug 
who are insured by Medicaid rather than the actual fraction that purchases the drug (which is the 
Medicaid market share described above). To do this we first use the list of the top 200 drugs in 
each year reported in the publication Med Ad News to determine for which conditions each drug 
is used. We then map this into diagnosis codes (ICD-9) using a comprehensive listing provided 
on the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) website.21 The third step is to determine the fraction of 
individuals with each diagnosis who are insured by Medicaid. To estimate this we use the CDC’s 
National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey (NAMCS) for 1997 and 2002, which provides 
detailed information about a large sample of patients in each year. We use the data on diagnosis 
and primary expected payer for 53,453 patients to count up how many have each diagnosis code 
as their primary diagnosis, and how many of them who have Medicaid as their primary expected 
payer. Aggregating these two numbers across diagnoses for each drug, we calculate our 
predicted Medicaid market share as the fraction of patients with the relevant diagnoses who are 
insured by Medicaid. 22 Note that if multiple drugs treat the same diagnosis, they will have the 
same predicted Medicaid share. 
Columns (1) and (4) of Table 3 summarize the results of our first-stage specifications. As 
can be seen in both columns, we find a statistically significant effect in the first stage: the 
predicted Medicaid share is significantly related to actual Medicaid share with a t-statistic greater 
than 10 in both 1997 an 2002. The remaining columns of Table 3 display the results of the 
second stage with clustering by diagnosis, given that predicted MMS does not vary within 
diagnosis. We estimate similar or larger positive point estimates than OLS for the effect of 
Medicaid on prices in both the log price and the rank order specifications. However, the MMS 
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coefficients in the 1997 sample are not statistically significant. We conclude that an instrumental 
variables approach yields similar results to the OLS specification.23 
This first set of results strongly suggests that the rules used by the federal government to 
set prices for prescription drugs have led to an increase in prices faced by other health care 
consumers. This is consistent with the theoretical predictions, which suggest that the elastic 
segment of the market would be made worse off by this type of price-setting rule (Tirole, 1991). 
 
IV. The Effect of the Medicaid Market Share on New Drug Introductions 
In this section we investigate whether drugs that sell disproportionately to the Medicaid 
program had more new drug introductions than their counterparts after controlling for other 
likely determinants of this outcome variable. 
A. Are New Versions of Prescription Drugs More Expensive? 
In the Appendix we describe the results from specifications that investigate whether new 
versions of a drug are indeed more expensive than earlier ones. If they were not, then our 
hypothesis that Medicaid’s CPI constraint creates an important distortion would be less 
plausible. The findings presented in Appendix Table 3 demonstrate that newer versions of a drug 
are 7 to 20 percent more expensive on average. This suggests that the CPI constraint described 
above would distort firms’ behavior because the optimal price for a particular drug appears to be 
increasing over time.24 
B. New Drug Introductions 
Our empirical strategy to test whether Medicaid regulations increase the number of 
versions of a drug that are introduced is as follows. Using our Medicaid utilization data, we can 
determine when new versions of a drug enter the market. We count the number of new NDCs 
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introduced between 1997 and 2002. We focus on our earlier sample because we are interested in 
the entry of new versions of a drug, which may take several years. 
We control for factors that are likely to influence the rate at which new versions of a drug 
are introduced. The first Log(Sales97), is simply equal to the log of total U.S. revenues for the 
drug in 1997. Because of the fixed costs of introducing a new version, as the total revenues for a 
drug increase so do the potential gains to releasing new versions. Likewise, we control for 
generic competition at the start of the period (1997), as this will affect growth of revenue in the 
future. Note that we have no ex ante prediction on the sign of this variable. It could be negative 
because of market share (revenue) erosion, or it could be positive, as the brand attempts to 
differentiate itself from generic competition. We also assume branded manufacturers correctly 
anticipate generic entry and subsequent revenue loss, and so we include a generic competition 
indictor at the end of the period (2002). Revenue loss in 2002 clearly affects the returns from 
launching a new product in 1997. The age of the drug is an additional variable that potentially 
measures the returns from proliferation, as it embodies the technology of the drug. Lastly, future 
returns are also affected by competition from therapeutic substitutes, so we include the same 
measure used in the price regression above. We control for the number of NDCs in 1997 
(NumNDC), as this may capture underlying demand for different versions and the costs of 
developing those versions when estimating specifications of the following form: 
)2()kClass(I*GenCompNumNDC)Sales(Log
YearsSubstGenCompMMSNewNDC
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In this regression, the variable NewNDC is simply equal to the number of NDCs with more than 
0.1 percent of a drug’s sales in 2002 and that had no utilization in 1997. We run Poisson 
regressions in this case given that the values for this variable are all integers and range from 0 to 
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6, though the estimates from a set of negative binomial regressions are almost identical. 
 The first column of Table 4 summarizes the results. As predicted, the estimate for the 
Medicaid share is positive, though it is not statistically significant. The estimate for the 
Log(Sales) coefficient is significantly positive, implying that large drugs introduce more new 
versions, while the coefficient estimates for Years on Market and Generic Competition are 
negative and significant for the former only; old drugs introduce fewer versions. This is logical 
because their cumulative future revenues are smaller and so the higher price they would obtain 
from a new version is worth less to them. In the second column of the table, therefore, we focus 
on newer drugs, drugs that were launched 6 or fewer years before 1997. 25 This leaves us with the 
half of the sample that has more to lose from a constrained low price because they will not face 
generic competition as soon, and the technology embodied in their drugs is newer and in higher 
demand. This set of drugs responds much more strongly to the Medicaid incentives, as we 
expected. In column (2), Medicaid market share is significantly (at the 10 percent level) 
positively related to the number of new NDCs introduced. 
In the next two columns we list the results from analogous specifications that include 
three indicator variables (50-99 million, 100-199 million, and 200+ million) for total sales to 
Medicaid. If there are fixed costs to launching a new version, the dollar amount of sales to 
Medicaid should affect the optimal rate of introduction of new versions. These results yield a 
similar picture, suggesting that new drugs with very high Medicaid sales are significantly more 
likely to introduce new versions. For example, the positive and significant coefficient on 
Medicaid Sales 200 million + in column (4) implies that, after controlling for total sales, the rate 
of new drug introduction for drugs with more than $200 million in Medicaid sales is more than 
twice as high as for those with less than $50 million in Medicaid sales. Similarly, firms 
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producing drugs with Medicaid sales between $100 and 200 million and $40 and 99 million 
introduce new versions at higher, though statistically insignificant, rates than firms selling 
otherwise similar drugs with low Medicaid sales. This final set of results therefore suggests that 
firms respond to the Medicaid CPI constraint, which aims to restrain the growth rate of 
pharmaceutical spending, by introducing new and more expensive versions of their drugs. 
 
V. Conclusion 
The results summarized in this paper demonstrate that prescription drugs sold 
disproportionately to Medicaid recipients have significantly higher prices than otherwise similar 
drugs. Because the Medicaid price is based on prices paid in the private sector, firms have a 
strong incentive to charge private patients more for their drugs than they otherwise would. To the 
extent that this happens, some private patients who would otherwise purchase these drugs are 
priced out of the market. Our second set of findings, that Medicaid’s CPI constraint creates 
additional product proliferation beyond what would exist in the absence of this constraint, is 
somewhat more subtle. The regulation only limits Medicaid price increases for existing products, 
so a firm can introduce a new product to obtain freedom to raise prices. Because of the fixed cost 
of introducing a new version, this strategy is only attractive for drugs with large sales to 
Medicaid and drugs expected to continue to have large sales to Medicaid. Our evidence indicates 
that the manufacturers of these drugs find the benefit of a new version outweighs the fixed cost 
required; these drugs proliferate more new NDCs than would otherwise be expected during our 
study period. 
The combination of these two findings leads us to conclude that the Medicaid 
procurement regulations distort market outcomes. More generally, our results suggest that 
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governments face a tradeoff when determining how optimally to set prices for any good or 
service that they procure. The benefits of using private sector prices is that governments have a 
difficult time “getting prices right,” and price has both important distributional consequences and 
substantial effects on innovation incentives. But a potentially important cost is the distortion of 
equilibrium outcomes in the private market, with this effect increasing with the government’s 
share of the market. 
Medicaid’s price-setting rules may substantially lower allocative efficiency for certain 
drug treatments, as some low valuation Medicaid recipients take the drug while other high-
valuation consumers without Medicaid coverage do not. Additionally, non-Medicaid consumers 
may purchase health insurance to reduce their medical expenditure, thus leading to further 
increases in prices.26 On the bright side, given its effect on pharmaceutical prices, Medicaid’s 
policies will increase a firm’s potential profits from entry and thus could lead to more innovation 
for drugs that differentially benefit low-income individuals.  More work that examines the effect 
of Medicaid and other government programs on innovation in this sector is clearly warranted. 27 
Our results take on additional policy significance when one considers that government 
involvement in the pharmaceutical industry will soon expand by a great deal due to the Medicare 
prescription drug benefit, which must necessarily have procurement policies also. At the same 
time, the impact of the Medicaid rules themselves will decline, as Medicaid recipients who are 
also eligible for Medicare will be shifted to the Medicare drug benefit. While less than 15 
percent of Medicaid recipients are dually eligible for Medicare, they account for 60 percent of 
Medicaid prescription drug spending.28  Estimating the incidence of the Medicare prescription 
drug benefit represents an important area for future research. 
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Appendices 
 
A. New treatments 
 
The unit of observation in these specifications is the NDC and each specification includes 
all versions of a drug with non-zero sales in each year. The odd and even-numbered columns of 
Appendix Table 3 summarize the results for specifications using the 1997 and 2002 samples, 
respectively, of the top 200 drugs and all specifications include drug fixed effects. The first two 
specifications use the log of the average price per prescription as the dependent variable.  The 
explanatory variable of interest is LaterVersion, which takes on a value of one if an NDC enters 
the market in the year that the drug is first available and zero otherwise. Our baseline 
specification is:  
∑
=
=λ+θ+= 200
1k
jjj )kDrug(I*onLaterVersi*a)ice(PrLog  
The 1997 sample includes 728 observations and the 2002 sample has 851. We exclude NDCs for 
which we do not have an entry date, which is less than 10 percent of the sample in both years.  
The statistically significant estimate of .108 for θ in the first column of Appendix Table 3 
suggests that newer versions of a drug are approximately 11 percent more expensive than the 
first version and this result is significant at the ten percent level. The results for the analogous 
specification using the 2002 sample of drugs yield slightly smaller estimates for θ, suggesting a 7 
percent increase in average price from initial to subsequent versions. Thus this is suggestive 
evidence of the optimal price for a drug increasing over time. 
Given that new versions of a drug may – on average - have different dosage amounts than 
earlier ones, an alternative and perhaps more appropriate measure of a drug’s price is the cost per 
unit. Thus we next use information in the Medicaid data on total units dispensed in 1997 and in 
2002 to calculate this for each NDC. The next two columns summarize the results from 
specifications using this dependent variable. In these regressions, we interact the drug fixed 
effects with indicators for route type (e.g. tablet, liquid, ointment, etc.) given that units for the 
same drug may not otherwise be comparable. Thus the number of fixed effects rises to 287 (from 
200) in the 1997 sample and 279 in the 2002 sample. The estimates for θ in this specification are 
approximately twice as large, once again suggesting that newer versions of a drug tend to be 
more expensive. 
 
B. Data Appendix 
 
1. Construction of the 1997 and 2002 samples: We use the IMS revenue data to identify the top-
selling 200 drugs in each year that are neither generic nor available over the counter in the 
relevant year. If a drug’s name is the same as its active ingredient we assume that it is generic. 
Revenues for different versions of the same drug (e.g. Prozac and Prozac Weekly) are aggregated 
to one observation. 
 
2. Calculating Medicaid sales for each drug in 1997 and 2002: We use utilization data that are 
available from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) website at 
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/medicaid/drugs/drug5.asp. This data provides quarterly information for 
the U.S. and for each individual state on the number of prescriptions filled for Medicaid 
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recipients and total Medicaid expenditures at the national drug code (NDC) level. This data is 
then merged to CMS drug product data to determine the name for each NDC along with 
information about whether the drug is generic, available over the counter, and the route type. The 
most recent version of this data, which is updated periodically, can be found at  
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/medicaid/drugs/drug6.asp. Some NDCs in the utilization data are not 
available in the drug product data. For these NDCs, first merge with data obtained from previous 
versions of the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA’s) National Drug Code Directory. The 
most recent version is available at  http://www.fda.gov/cder/ndc/index.htm. If information on an 
NDC is not available in either of these sets of files, then use the abbreviated name in the 
utilization data itself to determine the name of the drug. Select only those NDCs that are 
included in the sample of interest to calculate Medicaid market share in the relevant year. 
Medicaid revenues for different versions of the same drug are aggregated to one observation. If 
more than 10 percent of a drug’s sales are accounted for by generic or over-the-counter NDCs 
then drop the drug from the sample. 
 
3. Construction of outcome and explanatory variables: 
a. Medicaid market share: Total Medicaid expenditures divided by total U.S. revenues. For one 
drug in 1997 and three in 2002, this exceeds 1.00. This could be because our measure of 
Medicaid spending does not subtract out Medicaid rebates, which are not publicly available (we 
submitted an FOIA request to CMS but were unable to obtain this data), and thus our measures 
will to some extent overstate Medicaid spending. This could also be because of differences in the 
timing of reporting, with some pharmaceutical firms using fiscal years rather than calendar years. 
We test the sensitivity of our results to excluding these drugs and/or replacing the market share 
with 1.00 and find little difference. 
b. Price per prescription: Total Medicaid expenditures divided by total Medicaid prescriptions. 
This measure is used because the price per prescription is not available in the IMS data. We 
compared these prices with average prices for all heath care consumers for the top 50 drugs in 
2001. These were reported in the National Institute of Health Care Management’s (NIHCM’s) 
publication Prescription Drug Expenditures in 2001: Another Year of Escalating Costs 
(available at http://www.nihcm.org/spending2001.pdf). An OLS regression of our measure on 
this one yields a coefficient estimate of 1.036 with a standard error of .024, suggesting that the 
Medicaid data provides a quite reliable estimate of average prices for all U.S. consumers. 
c. Number of NDCs in 1997: The number of versions of a drug accounting for more than 0.1 
percent of a drug’s Medicaid utilization in each year. 
d. Number of new NDCs from 1997-2002: The number of versions of a drug with no utilization 
in 1997 and that accounted for more than 0.1 percent of a drug’s Medicaid utilization in 2002. 
e. Therapeutic category: There are 14 of these in the IMS data. The two most common ones in 
the top 200 samples are drugs used to treat mental disorders and heart conditions. Within each of 
these major categories there is an average of 18 subcategories. 
f. The number of substitutes. This is equal to the number of ingredients with nonzero sales in the 
relevant year within the drug’s therapeutic subcategory (of which there are 249 in the data). If a 
drug appears in multiple subcategories then assign it to the one with the largest sales. 
g. Any generic competition: This is set equal to one if there is any NDC in the Medicaid data 
with the same name as the drug’s ingredient name. In cases where the two names are very similar 
but not identical this was hand-checked. If a drug has multiple ingredients and any of them are 
generic then the drug is coded as facing generic competition. 
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h. Years on the market: The sample year (1997 or 2002) minus the year that the drug entered the 
market (included in the IMS data). If there are multiple entry years for the same drug then use 
the earliest one. 
 
4. Steps in calculating the instrument for Medicaid market share: 
a. Use the Med Ad News list of top 200 drugs in each year to determine for which conditions 
each drug is indicated. 
b. Match this information to ICD-9 codes using the Centers for Disease Control’s listing at 
ftp://ftp.cdc.gov/pub/Health_Statistics/NCHS/Publications/ICD-9/ucod.txt. 
c. Use data from the 1997 and 2002 versions of the National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey. 
This data includes detailed information on a “sample of visits to non-federally employed office-
based physicians who are primarily engaged in direct patient care.” Aggregating across these two 
surveys, there are 53,453 physician visits. 
d. Using the primary diagnosis ICD-9 code along with the information on each patient’s primary 
expected payer, determine what fraction of patients are on Medicaid for each ICD-9 code. 
e. Aggregate over all ICD-9 codes for which each drug is indicated to determine the fraction on 
Medicaid. This predicted Medicaid fraction is used in the IV analyses summarized in Table 3.  
Drop drugs from the sample that have fewer than 20 patients in the NAMCS.  This leads us to 
exclude 13 drugs from the 1997 sample and 23 from the 2002 sample. 
 
5. Construction of the sample with the top selling drugs in each subcategory: For each of the 249 
therapeutic subcategories, determine which drug is the top-seller in each year. If there are no 
drugs with nonzero sales in a year then exclude this subcategory. If there are multiple versions of 
the same drug then aggregate to one observation. Use the same algorithm as described in (2) 
above to calculate Medicaid sales for these drugs. If more than 10 percent of a drug’s sales are 
accounted for by generic or over-the-counter NDC’s then exclude this subcategory. 
 
6. Construction of the generic sample for Appendix Table 1 – select the top-selling drugs in 
which the ingredient name and drug name are identical in the IMS data. Collapse multiple 
versions of the same drug to one observation. Use the same algorithm as described in (2) above 
to calculate Medicaid sales for these drugs. Drop drugs for which more than 10 percent of sales 
are in over the counter versions or in brand (non-generic) versions. 
 
Notes 
                                                          
1 See papers such as Cutler-Gruber (1996) and Currie-Grogger (2002) on health care utilization, Epstein-Newhouse 
(1998) on health outcomes, Yelowitz (1995) on labor supply, and Gruber-Yelowitz (2001) on savings. For an 
excellent review of this literature see Gruber (2003). 
2 One exception is Scott Morton (1997) in which the author examines the effect of the most-favored-customer clause 
in Medicaid on price levels and price dispersion in the non-Medicaid market. 
3In recent years a number of states have introduced most co-pays. The largest co-pay in any state in the first quarter 
of 2005 is $3 and in most states this does not vary across brand drugs. Only 7 states have a co-pay that varies with 
price, with the maximum range from $0.50 to $3.00. 
4 Thus the net Medicaid price for a drug with AWP = $110 and AMP = $90 in a state that paid 90 percent of AWP 
to its pharmacies would be less than or equal to $85.41 (= (.90 * 110) – (.151 * 90)). If a firm sold to a non-
Medicaid customer in the U.S. at a price less than $85.41 during that quarter then the net Medicaid price would fall 
below this amount. There are a number of exceptions to this general description. For example, very low prices given 
to teaching hospitals, clinics, or other government programs do not count as the “best price.”  
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5 The definition of AMP used by CMS is “the average price at which a manufacturer sells a particular drug to 
purchasers, not including sales to federal purchasers or state drug assistance programs.” (Aldridge and Doyle, 2002).  
6 The way this works is as follows. First CMS determines if the best price or the straight 15.1 percent discount 
applies and determines the Medicaid rebate. Then it calculates whether the increase in its AMP since launch is 
greater than the increase in the CPI during that time. If so, the firm’s rebate increases by the difference between the 
actual and maximum allowable AMP. See http://www.cms.hhs.gov/medicaid/drugs/drug12.asp for more details. 
7 Since Medicaid recipients typically do not share in the cost of their prescription drugs, it is reasonable to assume 
that the actual price the firm charges the government does not affect their demand. However, many state 
governments have policies that attempt to steer Medicaid recipients toward lower cost prescriptions. These focus 
almost exclusively on physicians and other health care providers by, for example, requiring them to prescribe a 
generic version when it is available. However, providers can usually get around these constraints by, for example, 
writing “brand medically necessary” on t he prescription.  
8 Changes that are expected to have minimal chemical effects can be approved with a supplemental NDA, which 
does not require any clinical trials and so is relatively inexpensive. Minor changes include a different strength of an 
already approved medication or a change in manufacturing location. Any change in dosage form or in the 
recommended dosage amount will require a new NDA supported by Phase III clinical trials that show the new form 
of the drug achieves the same safety and efficacy standards as the original form. 
9 Average delays for a new drug application (NDA) are 10 months and for supplemental NDAs 4-6 months. Fees 
required by the FDA for either type of application averaged approximately $500,000 during our study period. The 
approximate cost of trials can be measured in the cost per patient recruited into a study, and the number of patients 
needed to show that the effects alleged by the applicant are statistically significant. Informal estimates of the costs of 
clinical trials range from $500 to $10,000 per patient depending on the length of time required to demonstrate 
results. For example, a cardiovascular drug would have to be taken longer (several months) than an antibiotic 
(several days) to demonstrate efficacy. 
10 In the IMS data, changes in dosage amount or route type usually do not show up as a separate product. 
11 Dollar figures cited in the paper are adjusted to 2002 dollars using a 1997 CPI of 160.5 and a 2002 CPI of 179.9. 
12 Note that our Medicaid expenditures do not include rebates paid to state governments, which accounted for 
approximately 15% of gross spending on prescription drugs in 1997 and in 2002 and which should be subtracted 
from these expenditure figures. Despite repeated requests to CMS, we were unable to obtain these data because they 
consider them proprietary. The fact that this 15% number is very close to the 15.1% of AMP described above 
suggests that there is not too much heterogeneity across drugs in the rebate amount as a fraction of the gross price. 
The absence of rebate data suggests that we will to some extent overstate the Medicaid market share. On the other 
hand, our data do not include spending under the 340B program of the Veterans Healthcare Act of 1992 (VHCA) 
which effectively allows some public health service programs to join the Medicaid procurement program. For 
example, state ADAP programs (AIDS drug assistance, $250 million in spending in 1997) may get their drugs this 
way (see Aldridge and Doyle, 2002). We do not have purchase data from these organizations, but as long as they are 
not both large and disproportionately purchasing non-Medicaid drugs, then we simply have a countervailing 
understatement of our Medicaid expenditure measure. 
13 The names are rarely identical between the two files because the Medicaid names often provide details on dosage 
amount or route type. Thus we take care to capture all Medicaid NDC’s that contain the string of each of the 200 
names in our IMS data. This involved a substantial amount of hand-checking because there were some spelling 
errors in the Medicaid data (e.g. Prilopec instead of Prilosec). Of the thousands of NDCs in each year, fewer than 
5% are in the top 200 drugs sold in the US. 
14 In some cases a drug falls into more than one therapeutic category and/or more than one subclass. In these cases 
we assign the drug to the category or subclass with the highest expenditures. This is possible because the IMS data 
differentiates between uses of a drug and thus one can determine what fraction of revenues for the drug fall into each 
category or subclass. 
15 For one drug in 1997 and three in 2002 Medicaid revenues exceed reported U.S. revenues and we therefore set the 
Medicaid share equal to 1.00. Our results were not substantially affected if we exclude these drugs from our 
subsequent empirical analyses. 
16 We would prefer to use the average price of a private-sector U.S. prescription as our measure of price, rather than 
a measure based on Medicaid purchases, but this information is unfortunately not publicly available and is not 
included in our IMS data. To investigate whether our measure of price is accurate, we compared our data to Scott-
Levin data reported for the top 50 drugs. (Scott-Levin is the other main private sector source of pharmaceutical 
expenditure and utilization data.) A regression of the log of the average price of a Medicaid prescription on the log 
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of the Scott-Levin measure yields a coefficient of 1.036 with a standard error of just .024. It therefore appears that 
our Medicaid data provides a good estimate of average pharmaceutical prices for all U.S. health care consumers. 
Our data are from 2002, the Scott-Levin data are from a 2001 and appeared in a publication by the National Institute 
of Health Care Management (2002). Five of their fifty drugs are not included in the regression because they are 
generic. Recall that rebates are excluded from our measure of Medicaid revenues.  
17 Plausibly exogenous increases in Medicaid share are not easy to come by. Aged, blind, and disabled recipients of 
Supplemental Security Income benefits account for the vast majority of pharmaceutical spending. For example, in 
California in 1997 more than 81% of prescription drug spending was for beneficiaries of this program (despite being 
less than one-fourth of recipients). The number receiving SSI nationally was fairly steady, increasing by less than 5 
percent from 6.495 million to 6.788 million during our 1997-2002 sample period. There were big increases from the 
mid 1980s to the mid 1990s but we do not have data for this earlier period. Increases in Medicaid coverage for 
children will not give us much increase in Medicaid market share both because they do not consume many drugs and 
because they will often end up in Medicaid managed care plans (if not on SSI). These plans typically buy the drugs 
themselves and thus do not contribute to our measured Medicaid market share (unless the plans use Medicaid prices, 
in which case they would appear in the state drug utilization data). 
18 The literature is divided on whether generic competition a) lowers the optimal price for a brand-name drug as 
consumers can easily substitute to a cheaper version, or b) raises the price of the brand as all elastic demanders move 
to the generic and the remaining customers have inelastic demand (Frank and Salkever (1997) and (1992)). Our test 
of interest (MMS) is not affected by which strategy brands use. 
19 The 14 category fixed effects control for broad differences across drugs in, for example, the share of privately 
insured consumers and the patients’ demographic characteristics. The classes are quite general. For example, there is 
one category for drugs used to treat mental disorders, another for drugs used to treat cardiovascular illnesses, and 
another for drugs used to treat cancer. There is considerable variation in the Medicaid market share within the 14 
therapeutic classes. A regression of the Medicaid share on the fourteen indicator dummies produces an R-squared of 
just 0.22 in 1997 and 0.30 in 2002. The weighted average standard deviation within a therapeutic category 
(weighting each category’s standard deviations by its share of the top 200 drugs) is about .11 in both years. This 
compares with overall standard deviations of .15 in both years. Thus, there is somewhat less variation within 
therapeutic categories than across all drugs, but not much less. 
20 We also interacted our measure of therapeutic substitutes with Medicaid market share to see if drugs that face 
more competition respond differentially to the pricing rules. We use the same specification as the odd columns of 
Table 2, and find the coefficient is statistically insignificant. 
21 See ftp://ftp.cdc.gov/pub/Health_Statistics/NCHS/Publications/ICD-9/ucod.txt 
22 This predicted share will to some extent underestimate the Medicaid share because individuals who are dually 
eligible for both Medicare and Medicaid will be likely to report Medicare as their primary expected payer. While 
“dual eligibles” account for just 15 percent of Medicaid recipients, they account for almost 60 percent of Medicaid 
prescription drug spending. The mismeasurement of drug coverage for dual eligibles may partially explain why our 
first stage estimates in Table 3 are substantially greater than 1.0. 
23 Our specifications assume that variation in drug prices does not cause people to become eligible for Medicaid. If 
individuals using expensive drugs qualify for Medicaid because of the high drug prices then the estimates for β1 
would be biased as a result of reverse causation. Given that less than 10 percent of Medicaid recipients qualify for 
the program because of high medical expenses (through the Medically Needy and Medically Indigent programs) and 
given that prescription drugs account for just 12 percent of all Medicaid spending this seems unlikely to be a 
significant factor. Additionally, SSI recipients – who would not qualify because of medical expenses but instead 
because of a disability - account for the vast majority of Medicaid spending on prescription drugs. 
24 As shown in the earlier version of this paper (Duggan and Scott Morton, 2004), an even more rapid increase 
occurs across drugs. For example, drugs released in 2001 or 2002 are more than twice as expensive on average as 
those released from 1995 to 1997.  
25 One can vary the cutoff for number of years between 4 and 12 and the estimated coefficient increases as the 
sample is restricted to more recent drugs. 
26 Alternatively individuals could try to become eligible for Medicaid given its increasing value as pharmaceutical 
prices rise. See Yelowitz (2002) for an estimation of the effect of state-level Medicaid generosity on SSI receipt. 
27 See Finkelstein (2004) for an investigation of the effect of vaccine coverage by the federal government. 
28 See Newhouse (2004) for a discussion of this legislation and the likely impact of alternative reimbursement rules. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that it has already increased pharmaceutical prices (Martinez, 2004). 
1997 Sample Mean Std. Dev. Median Min. Max.
Total Revenues (/ 1000) 255756 307930 138250 53708 2188413
Medicaid Revenues (/ 1000) 43274 65161 20632 3 413699
Medicaid Market Share 0.165 0.151 0.136 0.000 1.000
Predicted Medicaid Share 0.085 0.063 0.070 0.000 0.394
Price per Prescription 141 223 63 18 1645
Log (Price per Prescription) 4.39 0.90 4.14 2.87 7.41
Price Rank 100.5 57.9 100.5 1 200
# of Substitutes 14.13 13.58 11 0 146
Any Generic Competition 0.280 0.450 0 0 1
Years on the Market 9.10 8.30 6 0 55
# of NDCs in 1997 3.73 2.52 3 1 15
# of NDCs in 2002 4.12 2.63 4 1 17
# of new NDCs 0.58 1.03 0 0 6
2002 Sample Mean Std. Dev. Median Min. Max.
Total Revenues (/ 1000) 583024 718636 315200 117039 5677668
Medicaid Revenues (/ 1000) 102186 172950 50029 108 1668500
Medicaid Market Share 0.177 0.150 0.140 0.000 1.000
Predicted Medicaid Share 0.092 0.075 0.071 0.000 0.394
Price per Prescription 280 449 93 20 2883
Log (Price per Prescription) 4.90 1.09 4.53 3.01 7.97
Price Rank 100.5 100.5 100.5 1 200
# of Substitutes 14.99 12.17 13 0 127
Any Generic Competition 0.165 0.372 0 0 1
Years on the Market 8.23 7.48 6 0 60
Table 1: Summary Statistics for 1997 and 2002 Samples of Top 200 Drugs
Table provides summary statistics for the top 200 drugs in 1997 and in 2002 in terms of total 
revenues in the United States.  Generic and over-the-counter drugs are excluded.  Expenditure 
amounts are adjusted to 2002 dollars using the Consumer Price Index for all urban consumers 
(CPI-U).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Medicaid Market Share 0.674** 1.827** 0.943** 2.044*** 41.6** 44.1** 65.4*** 39.5**
(.317) (.837) (.410) (.750) (17.7) (20.5) (20.5) (15.7)
Any Generic Comp -0.231** -0.289 -0.095 -0.403 -13.6** -10.7 -9.3 -10.6
(.088) (.193) (.144) (.256) (6.7) (6.6) (8.6) (6.8)
# of Substitutes -0.008** -0.004 -.011* -.007* -0.578** -0.176 -.767* -.260**
(.003) (.004) (.007) (.004) (.239) (.165) (.412) (.112)
Years on Market -0.020*** -.023*** -0.028*** -.035*** -1.23*** -.693** -1.48*** -.938***
(.006) (.008) (.009) (.011) (.44) (.279) (.47) (.264)
# Observations 200 126 200 125 200 126 200 125
Sample 1997 1997 2002 2002 1997 1997 2002 2002
Class Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.593 0.389 0.621 0.515 0.556 0.381 0.567 0.517
Log(Price) Price Rank
Table 2: OLS Estimates of the Impact of Medicaid Market Share on Pharmaceutical Prices
Specifications in odd-numbered columns include the top 200 drugs in terms of total revenues in either 1997 or 2002.   
Specifications in even-numbered columns include the top-selling drug in each therapeutic subcategory in 1997 or 2002.   All four 
samples exclude over-the-counter and generic drugs.  The dependent variable in the first four columns is the log of the average 
price per prescription and in the second four columns is the price rank (200 is the most expensive drug and 1 is least expensive).  
The Medicaid market share for each drug is equal to Medicaid revenues divided by total revenues in the U.S.  Each specification 
includes 14 therapeutic class fixed effects.  Huber-White standard errors are reported in parentheses.  ***, **, and * represent 
significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
MMS Log(Price) Price Rank MMS Log(Price) Price Rank
Medicaid Market Share 1.134 24.4 1.793* 92.3*
(.853) (44.4) (.928) (46.4)
Predicted MMS 1.697*** 1.391***
(.158) (.110)
Any Generic Comp -0.005 -0.189 -11.3 0.005 -0.111 -9.5
(.019) (.130) (10.3) (.019) (.161) (9.4)
# of Substitutes 0.0003 -.008** -.586** 0.0004 -0.003 -0.407
(.0007) (.003) (.241) (.0009) (.008) (.504)
Years on Mkt -0.0002 -0.021*** -1.33*** 0.0012 -.023** -1.21**
(.0010) (.008) (.48) (.0010) (.009) (.50)
# Observations 187 187 187 177 177 177
Sample 1997 1997 1997 2002 2002 2002
Class Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.553 - - 0.660 - -
Table 3: IV Estimates of the Effect of Medicaid Market Share on Pharmaceutical Prices
1997 Sample 2002 Sample
The Medicaid market share (MMS) for a drug is the fraction of U.S. revenues accounted for by 
Medicaid. Columns (2), (3), (5), and (6) summarize the results from specifications in which MMS is 
instrumented by the predicted MMS (defined in the text and in the data appendix).  The results from the 
first-stage specifications for 1997 and 2002 are summarized in columns (1) and (4), respectively.  
Specifications in each column include the 200 top-selling drugs in 1997 or 2002, though those for which 
predicted MMS is missing are excluded.   The dependent variable in specifications (2) and (5) is the log 
of the average price per prescription and in specifications (3) and (6) is the price rank (200 is the most 
expensive drug and 1 is least expensive).  Each specification includes 14 therapeutic class fixed 
effects.  Standard errors are clustered by drug indication and are reported in parentheses.  ***, **, and * 
represent significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Medicaid Market Share in 1997 0.445 1.197*
(.723) (.629)
Medicaid Sales 50-99 million 0.072 0.389
(.347) (.472)
Medicaid Sales 100-199 million 0.331 0.686
(.424) (.755)
Medicaid Sales 200 million+ 0.441 1.234**
(.565) (.589)
Log(Sales97) 0.520*** .434** 0.415** 0.197
(.122) (.178) (.167) (.201)
Any Generic Competition in 97 0.019 -0.511 -0.014 -0.549
(.364) (.702) (.377) (.679)
# of Ther. Substitutes in 97 -0.021 -0.027 -0.021 -0.025
(.014) (.017) (.014) (.018)
Years on Market in 97 -0.075*** -0.068 -.077** -0.090
(.029) (.085) (.031) (.083)
Any Generic Competition in 02 0.108 0.311 0.091 0.373
(.288) (.550) (.289) (.525)
Number of NDC's in 97 0.138*** 0.103 0.143*** 0.146*
(.038) (.077) (.040) (.080)
# Observations 200 105 200 105
Class Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R-squared 0.165 0.154 0.167 0.162
Table 4: Poisson Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Impact of Medicaid on NDC Introductions
# of New NDCs Introduced from 1997 to 2002
Table summarizes the results from Poisson maximum likelihood specifications in which the 
dependent variable is the number of new versions of a drug introduced between 1997 and 2002.  
Specifications summarized in columns (1) and (3) include the top 200 drugs (excluding over-the-
counter and generic) based on total sales in the U.S. in 1997.  Specifications (2) and (4) include 
only those drugs from this group that were introduced in 1991 or later.  Each specification includes
14 therapeutic class fixed effects.  Huber-White standard errors are reported in parentheses.  ***, 
**, and * represent significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively.
Dosage Spending Prescriptions Avg Price FDA Enter Route Type
10 MG 637.1 1722.1 $370 Sep-96 Sep-96 Regular Tablet
5 MG 300.4 1449.0 $207 Sep-96 Sep-96 Regular Tablet
15 MG 225.9 528.7 $427 Sep-97 Jan-00 Regular Tablet
20 MG 191.5 371.7 $515 Sep-97 Dec-00 Regular Tablet
2.5 MG 177.6 1077.9 $165 May-97 May-97 Regular Tablet
7.5 MG 76.9 338.1 $228 Sep-96 Sep-96 Regular Tablet
10 MG 24.4 70.0 $391 Apr-00 Aug-00 Dissolvable Tablet
5 MG 19.3 82.4 $234 Apr-00 Aug-00 Dissolvable Tablet
20 MG 7.1 12.9 $548 Apr-00 Sep-01 Dissolvable Tablet
15 MG 5.5 11.9 $459 Apr-00 Sep-01 Dissolvable Tablet
All 1668.5 5664.7 $295 Sep-96 Sep-96 All
Appendix Table 1: Medicaid Utilization for Zyprexa in 2002
Table summarizes Medicaid spending and utilization for the ten different versions of Zyprexa in 2002.  
Spending represents total Medicaid spending in millions while precriptions is the number of prescriptions in 
thousands.  The average price represents the average price per prescription.  The columns headed FDA 
and Enter represent the month that each version received FDA approval and entered the market, 
respectively.  Each version differs from the others with respect to either dosage amount or route type.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Medicaid Market Share -0.081 -0.249 -17.8 -20.3
(.263) (.268) (14.4) (14.0)
# of Substitutes 0.002 -.008* 0.272 -0.420
(.004) (.005) (.249) (.304)
Years on Market -.026*** -.040*** -1.68*** -2.37***
(.008) (.006) (.48) (.34)
# of Firms Producing Drug -.057*** -.054*** -3.32*** -3.18***
(.009) (.012) (.54) (.71)
# Observations 200 200 200 200
Sample 1997 2002 1997 2002
Class Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.519 0.507 0.469 0.453
Appendix Table 2: The Effect of Medicaid Market Share for Generic Drugs
Log(Price) Price Rank
Specifications include the top 200 generic drugs in terms of total revenues in either 1997 
or 2002.   The dependent variable in the first two columns is the log of the average price 
per prescription and in the second two columns is the price rank (200 is the most 
expensive drug and 1 is least expensive).  The Medicaid market share for each drug is 
equal to Medicaid revenues divided by total revenues in the U.S.  Each specification 
includes 14 therapeutic class fixed effects.  Huber-White standard errors are reported in 
parentheses.  ***, **, and * represent significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels, 
respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Later Version 0.108* 0.071 0.191*** 0.203***
(.057) (.057) (.072) (.064)
# Observations 728 851 728 851
Sample 1997 2002 1997 2002
R-squared 0.782 0.865 0.907 0.942
Drug Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Drug-Route Fixed Effects? No No Yes Yes
Appendix Table 3: Are New Versions of a Drug More Expensive?
Log(Price per Prescription) Log(Price per Unit)
Specifications include all NDCs for the top 200 drugs (excluding over-the-counter and 
generic) in 1997 or 2002 in terms of total U.S. revenues.  The dependent variable in 
specifications one and two is the log of the average price per prescription for each NDC while 
in three and four it is the log of the average price per unit.  The first two specifications include 
200 drug fixed effects while the last two include 287 drug-route fixed effects.  Huber-White 
standard errors are reported in parentheses.  ***, **, and * represent significance at the one, 
five, and ten percent levels, respectively.
